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I
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Appellant Tracy L. Southwick
and the Appellees Frank Leone and Sam Leone (hereinafter, "the
Leones").

Christine Montoya was also a party to the litigation at the

trial court level, however, it is unknown if she will be participating
in this appeal.
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V
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS
1.

Mr. Southwick disputes the assertion of fact contained in

paragraph 9 of the Leones' Statement of Facts.

Contrary to the

Leonesf assertion, the record does not establish, as a fact, that Mr.
Southwick failed to provide either the Leones or any of the Leone
family members with a copy of the amended divorce complaint.

Page

105 of the record is simply Mr. Hadley's argument, contained in his
memorandum in support of the Leones' Motion to Determine that Mr.
Southwick has no Interest in the P.O.D. Account or insurance proceeds.
Pages 143-145 is the amended divorce complaint.

Neither of those

documents establish, as a matter of fact, that the Leones were not
provided a copy of the amended divorce complaint.

Mr. Hadley's

assertion that the Leones did not receive a copy of the amended

complaint i s not even contained in the statement of f a c t s in h i s
memorandum.

I t i s simply argument.

The amended complaint does not

establish as a fact that the Leones were not given a copy of the
amended complaint.1
2.

Mr. Southwick also objects to paragraph No. 24 of the

Leones' Statement of Facts, contained in their Brief.

Contrary to the

Leones' assertion, pages 72-73 of the record do not refer to any
alleged conversation between Sam Leone and Mr. Southwick and do not
establish that Mr. Southwick stated that:

"whatever he brought into

the marriage was his and whatever [Catherine Leone] brought into the
marriage was hers."

Page 72 of the record is the second page of an

annual accounting, and page 73 is the first page of a petition for
approval of annual accounting.

Mr. Southwick disputes the assertions contained in paragraphs 1-5, set forth on pages 21-23 of the Leones' Brief In paragraph
1, the Leones assert, without any factual basis or citation to the record, that Mr. Southwick never indicated he was making a claim to the P.O.D.
account prior to Mrs. Southwick's death.
In paragraph 2, the Leones falsely assert that pages 72-73 of the record establish that Mr. Southwick had a meeting wherein he stated that
"whatever he brought into the marriage was his and whatever [Catherine] brought into the marriage was hers." Page 72 of the record is the last page
of an annual accounting. Page 73 is the first page of a Petition for Approval of an Annual Accounting.
In paragraph 3, the Leones falsely assert that the record at pages 105, 139-141 and 143-145 establish that neither the Leones nor any
Leone family member was provided a copy of the amended complaint of divorce. Page 105 of the record is simply Mr. Hadley's argument contained
in his memorandum in support of the Leones' Motion to Determine that Mr. Southwick has no interest in the P.O.D. Account. Pages 143-145 is the
amended divorce complaint. Neither of those documents establish as a matter of fact that the Leones were not provided a copy of the amended
complaint Mr. Hadley's assertion that the Leones did not receive a copy of the amended complaint is not even contained in his statement of facts in his
memorandum. It is simply argument. The amended complaint does not establish as a fact that the Leones were not given a copy of the amended
complaint
Mr. Southwick also disputes the assertions contained in paragraph No. 4, wherein the Leones assert that Mr. Southwick "abandoned" Mrs.
Southwick. There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Southwick abandoned Mrs. Southwick. Pages 56-57 are Mr. Southwick's Demand for
Payment There is nothing in the Demand establishing that Mr. Southwick abandoned Mrs. Southwick. Pages 96-117 are the Leones Motion and
Memorandum to Determine that Mr. Southwick had no interest in the P.O D. account and insurance proceeds. They do not establish any fact and
certainly not the fact that Mr. Southwick abandoned Mrs. Southwick.

F

VI
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE BURIAL PLOT,
BURIAL EXPENSES, CO-CONSERVATOR FEES, TELEVISION & ANTENNA,
AND COURT COSTS WERE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES FOR MRS.
SOUTHWICK'S NECESSARY SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE. THE TRIAL
COURT FURTHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE LEONES WERE ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD OF CONSERVATOR'S
FEES, AND THAT THE LEONES ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO
MR. SOUTHWICK FOR THE FUNDS FROM THE P.O.D. ACCOUNT THEY GAVE TO MS.
MONTOYA
POINT I
MR. SOUTHWICK DOES NOT NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
C o n t r a r y t o t h e A p p e l l e e ' s a s s e r t i o n s , Mr. S o u t h w i c k d o e s n o t
need to demonstrate t h a t the t r i a l

c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n t h i s m a t t e r was

c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s i n o r d e r t o p r e v a i l on t h i s A p p e a l .
t r u e t h a t Mr. S o u t h w i c k c h a l l e n g e s c e r t a i n f a c t u a l
trial

While i t

c o n c l u s i o n s of

c o u r t , Mr. S o u t h w i c k ' s A p p e a l i s p r i m a r i l y b a s e d on

the

assertions

t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d a s a m a t t e r of law i n m a k i n g t h e
a n d r u l i n g s t h a t a r e on a p p e a l i n t h i s p r o c e e d i n g .

is

decisions

Therefore,

and

c o n t r a r y t o t h e A p p e l l e e ' s a s s e r t i o n i n P o i n t I of t h e i r B r i e f ,

the

p r o v i s i o n s of R u l e 52 of t h e U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l P r o c e d u r e a r e n o t
controlling in t h i s matter.

This Court i s free t o ignore t h e

trial

c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s o f law and a p p l y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e law t o t h e
o f t h i s c a s e and e n t e r a c o r r e c t

facts

decision.

POINT n
THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LEONES ARE NOT
LIABLE TO MR. SOUTHWICK FOR HIS SHARE OF THE P O D . ACCOUNT THEY
IMPROPERLY AND UNLAWFULLY DISTRIBUTED TO MS. MONTOYA.
The L e o n e s f a l s e l y a s s e r t t o t h i s C o u r t t h a t Mr. S o u t h w i c k
making h i s c l a i m a g a i n s t t h e A p p e l l e e s as

"co-guardians/co-

is

conservators."

The assertion is a knowing falsehood and a deliberate

effort to mislead this Court.2

Pages 24-25 of Mr. Southwick's Brief

do not, as asserted by the Leones, state that Mr. Southwick's claim
against the Leones is in their alleged capacity as co-conservators/coguardians.

On pages 24-25 Mr. Southwick simply asserts that during

the time the Leones acted as co-conservators/co-guardians, the Leones
breached their fiduciary duty to Mr. Southwick.
Mr. Southwick has maintained from the time he first asked for his
rightful share of the P.O.D. account and his share of the insurance
policy that the Leones had no authority to act as co-conservators/coguardians of Mrs. Southwick after her death.

Judge Bohling

specifically ruled, in denying the Appellee's request for attorney's
fees, that subsequent to her death, the Leones had no authority to act
as co-conservators/co-guardians on behalf of Mrs. Southwick.

(Record,

page 699). The Appellees did not appeal that decision and are now
estopped to challenge it.
Furthermore, the Leones have not challenged or attempted, in
anyway whatsoever, to dispute the authority cited by Mr. Southwick in
his Brief or in his memoranda filed in the trial court, that a
guardian's/conservator's power and authority terminates on the death
of the ward and have in fact admitted that they had no authority to
act on behalf of Mrs. Southwick or her estate after her death.
(Leones' Brief, page 45). Therefore, the Leones have conceded, as a
matter of law, that their power and authority to act as co-

2 Footnote 2 of the Leones' Brief is a deliberate misrepresentation of the facts. Mr. Southwick filed his request for payment with the
Leones as conservators because they had the obligation to pay according to the terms of the P.O.D. account. However, after they refused to do so and
proceeded with litigation and gave the P.O.D. funds to Ms. Montoya, they were acting not as conservators but as individuals, and they are liable to Mr.
Southwick as individuals.

ardians/co-conservators of Mrs. Southwick terminated at her death.
Because it is undisputed that the Leones1 power to act as conservators/co-guardians for Mrs. Southwick terminated at her death,
L of the Leones1 references to the standard of care and duties of a
iservator are irrelevant.

As a matter of law, the Leones were not

:ing as co-conservators/co-guardians at the time they refused to pay
Southwick his lawful share of the P.O.D. account, at the time they
*ed Mr. Hadley to represent the estate, at the time they changed the
Leficiaries on the insurance policy issued to Mrs. Southwick, at the
.e they pursued litigation to prevent Mr. Southwick from obtaining
rightful share of the P.O.D. account, and at the time they gave
Southwickfs share of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya.

Judge

ich's ruling that the Leones are not personally liable to Mr.
thwick is simply legally incorrect.
The Leones' sole power and authority after Mrs. Southwick1s death
to pay the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to the beneficiaries of
account.

They had no power or authority to determine the validity

.ny claim on the P.O.D. account.

They had no authority to litigate

validity of any claim to the account.

If the Leones questioned

Southwickfs right to a share of the P.O.D. account, their duty was
eposit the money with the trial court in this case, file an
rpleader action and deposit the P.O.D. funds with the court in
case, as the insurance company did with the insurance proceeds,
Let the beneficiaries litigate ownership of the P.O.D. account or
rer the P.O.D. funds to the personal representative of Mrs.
lwick's estate for a determination of what to do with the P.O.D.
int.

The Leones were not appointed to act as the personal
representative(s) of Mrs. Southwick's estate.
such appointment.

They never sought any

Furthermore, because the P.O.D. account was not

property of Mrs. Southwick1s estate, the Leones never had any power or
legal authority to litigate the legitimacy of any claims to the P.O.D.
account, even had they been appointed as co-personal representatives
of Mrs. Southwick's estate.
The Leones had no authority of any kind to deny Mr. Southwick his
lawful share of the P.O.D. account.

They had no authority of any kind

to litigate Mr. Southwick's claim to a portion of the P.O.D. account.
They had no authority of any kind to give the proceeds of the P.O.D.
account to Ms. Montoya.
Because the Leones had no authority to deny Mr. Southwick his
lawful share of the P.O.D. account, to litigate Mr. Southwick's claim
to a portion of the P.O.D. account or to give the proceeds of the
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya, the Leones are personally liable to Mr.
Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account they unlawfully and
improperly gave to Ms. Montoya.

The trial court committed prejudicial

and reversible error when it concluded that the Leones were not
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for giving his lawful share of the
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya.

Therefore, the trial court's decision

must be reversed, with directions that it enter an order finding the
Leones personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his portion of the
P.O.D. account they improperly and unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya.

POINT III
THE LEONES' ASSERTION THAT MR. SOUTHWICK DISCLAIMED ANY RIGHT TO THE
POD. ACCOUNT IS NOT ONLY FALSE, IT IS AN ASSERTION THAT WAS NEVER MADE AT
THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL AND, THEREFORE, IS IMPROPERLY ASSERTED AT THIS TIME.
The Leones are again attempting to illicit sympathy from this
Court by claiming that Mr. Southwick was dishonest and immoral in the
manner in which he obtained his divorce from Mrs. Southwick.

That

assertion is not only nonsense, it was addressed by this Court in Mr.
Southwick's first appeal to this Court and found to be untrue.

In his

first appeal, this Court specifically found that Mr. Southwick
obtained the divorce from Mrs. Southwick for her best interest.

(In

Re the Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah App. 1993), footnote
2.)
The Leones' assertion that Mr. Southwick waived any right to the
P.O.D. account is also nonsense.

This Court has already ruled as a

matter of law that Mr. Southwick is entitled to one-half of the P.O.D.
account, the Leones' assertions not withstanding.

Furthermore, the

Leones never raised this assertion in the trial court, and they cannot
raise it now for the first time.

However, even assuming, arguendo,

that the Leones had timely raised Mr. SouthwickTs alleged waiver of
any claim to the P.O.D. account, they have no evidence to support that
spurious and disingenuous assertion.
The Leones' claim that paragraph No. 8 of Mr. Southwick1s Divorce
Petition proves that Mr. Southwick was disclaiming any right to the
P.O.D. account.

That paragraph proves nothing more than the fact that

Mr. Southwick1s attorney did not recognize or realize Mr. Southwick1s
right to a share of the P.O.D. account when he prepared the divorce
petition.

The Leones then assert that the amended divorce petition with a
changed paragraph No. 8 indicates fraud and deceit on the part of Mr.
Southwick.

Contrary, to the Leones' assertions, all the amended

petition demonstrates is that, after preparing the divorce petition,
Mr. Southwick's attorney recognized his mistake with respect to the
P.O.D. account and corrected that mistake in the amended petition.
Again, the issue of Mr. Southwick1s reason for, and method of,
obtaining a divorce from Mrs. Southwick has been addressed by this
Court and the Leones are estopped to rehash the conclusion in this
Appeal.
The Leones also make the incredulous assertion that Mr. Southwick
is negligent for relinquishing his signature authority on the P.O.D.
account.

That assertion is so inane it is mind-boggling.

The Leones

would only agree to Mr. Southwick1s appointment as
conservator/guardian of Mrs. Southwick if Mr. Southwick relinquished
his right as a signatory on the account at the time he resigned as
guardian/conservator.

Therefore, the Leones cannot, now ask this

Court to find that Mr. Southwick was negligent because he relinquished
his signature authority on the P.O.D. account, rather than retaining
it, in order to prevent the Leones from misusing, co-mingling and
improperly distributing the proceeds of the P.O.D. account.
assertion is utter nonsense.

Such an

It was never raised at the trial court,

and it cannot be raised at this time in this proceeding.

POINT IV
THE LEONES' ASSERTION THAT MR. SOUTHWICK IS TO BLAME FOR FAILING TO
PROTECT THE POD. ACCOUNT IS LUDICROUS.
The Leones assert that Mr. Southwick should have protected the

P.O.D. account by filing a supersedeas bond under the provisions of
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 62").
The Leones ask this Court to ignore that the mere filing of a
supersedeas bond does not automatically result in a stay.

In

pertinent part, Rule 62 states:
When appeal is taken the Appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay,
unless such stay is otherwise prohibited by law of these rules. The bond may be given at
or after the time of filing the notice of appeal. (Emphas i s added) .
A stay may be conditioned upon the filing of a bond, but the mere
filing of a bond does not guarantee a stay, as the Leones imply.
is a supersedeas bond required in order to obtain a stay.

Nor

The

decision as to whether a supersedeas bond is required on an appeal
rests with the trial court in the first instance, and contrary to the
Leones' implication, under no circumstances can a stay be obtained
without first filing a motion for a stay.
The Leones' assertion that Mr. Southwick should have filed a
supersedeas bond to protect the P.O.D. account is nothing more than a
spurious and disingenuous attempt on the part of the Leones to
distract this Court from their unlawful and improper actions.
of a supersedeas bond would have been useless and senseless.
P.O.D. account was security enough.

Filing
The

No bond needed to be filed. Mr.

Southwick was not attempting to preclude another party from enforcing
a judgment against him or to preclude another party from engaging in
some activity, which the preclusion therefrom would have resulted in
harm to the other party.

Mr. Southwick was only attempting to

preclude his lawful share of the P.O.D. account from being distributed
pending resolution of his claim to the account by this Court.

The Leones are also asking this Court to ignore the fact that the
Leones gave the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya after
Mr. Southwick had filed a Motion for a Stay of Distribution and while
this case was on appeal. Are the Leones asking this Court to believe
that they would not have given the money to Ms. Montoya if Mr.
Southwick had filed a supersedeas bond?

Why should this Court believe

that the Leones would have acted any differently if Mr. Southwick had
filed a supersedeas bond?
changed somehow?

Would the trial court's decision have

Would their counsel's advice concerning their right

to give the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya have
changed?

Would the Leones have waited until after the trial court

ruled on Mr. Southwick's Motion for a Stay of distribution before
giving the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya?
If anything, by filing a supersedeas bond, Mr. Southwick would
have given the Leones more justification to give the proceeds of the
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya.

After all, there would have then been

a supersedeas bond on which Mr. Southwick could make a claim.

Of

course, he would have been paying himself, since he would have to pay
for the bond.
If the Leones were willing to give the proceeds of the P.O.D.
account to Ms. Montoya, knowing that the trial court's decision was on
appeal and knowing the a Motion for Stay of Distribution had been
filed and was pending, there is absolutely no evidence or implication
that the Leones would have acted any differently if Mr. Southwick had
filed a supersedeas bond.

The only thing that would have been

different is that Mr. Southwick would have wasted the time, effort and
expense of obtaining a bond.

If Mr. Southwick wanted to pay himself

his share of the P.O.D. account he never would have made a claim on
the Account or maintained this litigation.
It is an undisputed fact that Mr. Southwick sought and was given
a stay.

The trial court did not condition that stay on Mr. Southwick

filing a supersedeas bond.

The Leones knowingly and intentionally

gave the proceeds of the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya while this case
was on appeal and while Mr. Southwickfs Motion for a Stay was pending.
(Record, page 851). Had Mr. Southwick filed a supersedeas bond, it
would have been useless.
The Leones had no authority to distribute the proceeds of the
P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya, bond or no bond.

Therefore, they are

personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account
they unlawfully and improperly gave to Ms. Montoya.
The Leones knew at the time the unlawfully transferred the P.O.D
funds to Ms. Montoya they had no right to do so.

They even sought to

transfer the responsibility for their unlawful actions to Ms. Montoya
by making her sign a document absolving them of any liability for
transferring the money to her.

(Record, page 308) .3

The Leones also

entered into an agreement with Ms. Montoya whereby she agreed to set
aside a certain portion of the P.O.D. funds given her in the event Mr.
Southwick prevailed on his appeal to this Court.
807).

(Record, pages 806-

The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when

it concluded that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr.
Southwick for giving his lawful share of the P.O.D. account to Ms.

The Leones' actions clearly contradicts their assertion that they did not believe that they had any liability to Mr. Southwick. Why
would they have insisted that Ms. Montoya set aside part of the P.O.D. account in the event Mr. Southwick's appeal was successful, if they believed

they were acting within their legal rights and in conjunction with the trial court's order? Why would the have required Ms. Montoya to sign
an agreement absolving them of any liability in connection with the P.O.D. funds, if they believed they had no liability to Mr. Southwick?

Montoya.

Therefore, the trial court's decision must be reversed and

with directions that it enter an order finding the Leones personally
liable to Mr. Southwick for his portion of the P.O.D. account they
improperly and unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya.
POINT V
THE FACTS INDISPUTABLY ESTABLISH THAT THE LEONES CONVERTED THE PROCEEDS
OF THE POD. ACCOUNT.
It is undisputed that the Leones converted the proceeds of the
P.O.D. account.

First the Leones, in violation of the trial court's

order of March 2, 1988 and the February 3, 1988 Stipulation filed with
the trial court, took the funds of the P.O.D. account out of the bank
in which they were deposited, placed them in their personal account(s)
and then proceeded to invest the proceeds in the bond market.
(Record, page 585).

Next the Leones, without any authority of any

nature whatsoever, paid to themselves the sums of $17,000.00 and
$13,000.00 in conservator's fees.

(Record, page 588). And finally,

without any legal authority of any type, the Leones improperly and
unlawfully gave Ms. Montoya the proceeds of the P.O.D. account.
The Leones may have returned a portion or even all of the funds
they converted from the P.O.D. account to their own uses, after
playing in the bond market, and they may have returned a portion or
all of the monies they improperly and unlawfully paid themselves as
conservator's fees, but that does not change the fact that they
violated the March 2, 1988 court order, used the funds, unlawfully
paid themselves conservator's fees and invest in the bond market.
The Leones' assertion that their conversion of the P.O.D. account
funds was.pursuant to a court order is a deliberate misstatement of

fact and law. As previously set forth in this Brief, the Leones never
had any authority to do anything with respect to the P.O.D. account or
the estate of Mrs. Southwick after her death other than to pay the
proceeds of the P.O.D. account to the beneficiaries or to file an
interpleader action.

They never had any authority to take the funds

of the P.O.D account out of the bank and invest them in the bond
market, and they never had any authority to give the funds to Ms.
Montoya.
The Leones were not the personal representatives of Mrs.
Southwick1s estate.

They had no authority to act on behalf of the

estate of Mrs. Southwick after her death.
pay expenses on behalf of the estate.

They had no authority to

Their sole power and authority

was to pay the funds of the P.O.D. account to the beneficiaries and to
turn-over all other assets of Mrs. Southwick1s estate to the personal
representative.

They had no power or authority to appoint themselves

personal representatives of the estate of Mrs. Southwick, and they had
no power to make any decisions or take any actions on behalf of the
estate of Mrs. Southwick.
Because the Leones had no legal authority to act on behalf of the
estate of Mrs. Southwick, subsequent to her death, because the Leones1
authority as co-guardians/co-conservators terminated at Mrs.
Southwick1s death, and because the P.O.D. account was never a part of
Mrs. Southwick's estate, any use of the P.O.D. account funds, by the
Leones, subsequent to Mrs. Southwickfs death, was unlawful.

Because

the Leones unlawfully used, converted and then paid the proceeds of
the P.O.D. account to Ms. Montoya, they are personally liable to Mr.
Southwick for that conversion.

Therefore, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible
error with it concluded that the Leones were not personally liable to
Mr. Southwick for giving his lawful share of the P.O.D. account to Ms.
Montoya.

The trial court's decision must be reversed and with

directions that it enter an order finding the Leones are personally
liable to Mr. Southwick for his portion of the P.O.D. account they
improperly and unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT VARIOUS EXPENSES WHICH WERE
NOT FOR MRS. SOUTHWICK'S SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE COULD BE CHARGED
AGAINST THE P O D ACCOUNT.
The Leones assert in Point III of their brief that Mr.
Southwick is asserting that the P.O.D. account could only be used for
Mrs. Southwickfs medical care and treatment.

That statement is

partially correct. Mr. Southwick is asserting, as stipulated by the
parties to the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and March 2, 1988 Order,
filed in this matter, that the P.O.D. funds can only be used for Mrs.
Southwick1s medical expenses or other expenses incurred for the
necessary support and maintenance of Mrs. Southwick.
20, 1 4; page 29, 1 2).

(Record, page

Moreover, Judge Rokich specifically stated at

trial of this matter that the Leones were entitled to use all moneys
above the $4 6,000.00 in the P.O.D. account in any way they deemed
necessary for Mrs. Southwick's benefit.

However, if the Leones wanted

to use any of the funds of the P.O.D. account, they had to establish
that the use was for a "necessary medical expense."

(Record, page

827, lines 6-8).
Judge Rokich is the judge who signed the March 2, 198 8 Order.

He

is the proper person to interpret its meaning and applicability.

His

statement that the Leones could only use the P.O.D. funds for
necessary medical expenses is a proper and controlling interpretation
of the March 2, 1988 Order, as well as the February 3, 1988
Stipulation.

Therefore, it is Judge Rokich who is stating that the

P.O.D. account can only be used to pay expenses for medical care and
treatment, not Mr. Southwick.

Although, Mr. Southwick agrees with

Judge Rokich's interpretation of the March 2, 1988 Order, as well as
the February 3, 1988 Stipulation, specifying that the P.O.D account
can only be used for payment of medical expenses care and treatment.
The Leones assert that "support and maintenance", as used in the
March 2, 1988 Order, as well as the February 3, 1988 Stipulation means
anything the Leones deem proper.

Support is defined as that which

furnishes a livelihood; a source or means of living; subsistence,
sustenance, or living.

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, 1979,

page 1291. Maintenance is defined as the furnishing by one person to
another, of the means of living, or food, clothing, shelter, etc.
Blume v. State Board of Education of Montana, 97 Mont. 371, 34 P.2d
515, 519.

Support and maintenance includes food, clothing, shelter

and basic necessities of life, as well as reasonable and necessary
transportation expense, utility expenses, medical and drug expenses.
Moss v. Moss, 379 S.2d 1206 (La.App. 1980).

Food, drink, clothing

medical attention and a suitable place of residence are allowable as
necessaries.

39 C.J.S., Guardian & Ward, §65.

Clearly, none of the alleged expenses to which Mr. Southwick
objects were for Mrs. Southwick's means of living, food, clothing,
shelter, subsistence, or sustenance.

Therefore, by the express terms

of the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and March 2, 1988 Order, they are
not items that can be charged against the P.O.D. account.

The Leones'

attorney prepared both the Stipulation and Order. Therefore, they are
now estopped to challenge or dispute its contents, intent or
enforceability.
Contrary to the Leones1 assertion they were not legally entitled
to invade the P.O.D, account to pay any expenses without first
establishing that there were not other funds from which those expenses
could be paid.

The Leones failed to do so.

Therefore, they are

precluded from asserting that their payment of any expenses were
justified under the provisions of the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and
the March 2, 1988 Order, even assuming, arguendo, they were legitimate
expenses, which they were not.
The Leones1 assertions to the contrary, Sam Leone never testified
that the Leones did not have funds other than the P.O.D. account with
which to pay Mrs. Southwick's expenses.

(Leones1 brief, page 35).

Sam Leone's testimony is simply that they had commingled the P.O.D.
account with other funds of Mrs. Southwick.
account.

"It was out of the

We did not consider it a P.O.D. Account at that time."

(Record, page 786, lines 4-5).
Assuming, arguendo, that the assertions in the Leones' Brief are
correct, Sam Leone's testimony to the contrary, it is an undisputed
fact that the Leones had other funds available with which to pay Mrs.
Southwick's expenses.4 As established by their own documents on file
in this matter, the Leones received at least $16,700.00 during the

Sam Leones' testimony does not establish any fact, especially when it is contradicted by his own documentation and admissions of his
counsel made in court. (Record, page 831).

Lute they were acting as co-conservators/co-guardians for Mrs.
Duthwick.

(Record, 831, lines 21-22).

Therefore, Sam Leone's

sstimony that the Leones had no funds other than the P.O.D. account
.th which to pay Mrs. Southwick's expenses is disingenuous at best.
The Leones' assertion that other funds received on Mrs.
•uthwick's behalf during the time they were acting as conservators/co-guardians were used to pay Mrs. Southwick's nursing
re costs is simply not true.

(Leones1 brief, page 36, footnote 10).

the Leones1 own records only $5,2 69.68 of the funds received by the
ones during the time they were acting as co-conservators/coardians were used to pay Mrs. Southwick's nursing care costs,
srefore, by the Leones own admissions, they had not less than
L, 430.32 with which to pay for Mrs. Southwick's burial expenses.
>cord, pages 585, 588).
A. Burial Expenses.
The trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law
concluding that the cost of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot and burial
n could be paid out of the P.O.D. account.

Because the purchase of

. Southwick's burial plot and her burial plan were not a "necessary
ical expense" or for her necessary support and maintenance, those
snses could not properly be charged to the P.O.D. account.

Because

Leones had access to other funds with which to pay Mrs.
:hwick's burial costs, they are not legally entitled to invade the
D. account for payment of those expenses.

Therefore, the trial

:t erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law in concluding
: the cost of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot and burial plan could be
9H

paid out of the P.O.D. account.
reversible.

That error was prejudicial and

Consequently this Court must reverse the trial court's

ruling that the costs of Mrs. Southwick's burial is chargeable to the
P.O.D. account.

B. Court Costs.
The trial court clearly erred as a matter of fact and as a matter
of law in concluding that the Leones1 court costs could be paid out of
the P.O.D. account.

It is an indisputable fact that the Leones' court

costs, for what ever purpose, were not a necessary medical expense or
for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and maintenance.

By the

express terms of the February 3, 1998 Stipulation and the March 2,
1988 Order, the LeonesT court costs could not properly be charged to
the P.O.D. account.

Judge Bohling correctly ruled that the Leones had

no authority to take any action on behalf of the Estate of Mrs.
Lsouthwick after her death, including hiring Mr. Hadley and
prosecuting any legal action.

(Record, page 699). Consequently, the

trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter of law in
concluding that the Leones1 court costs could be paid out of the
P.O.D. account.

That error was prejudicial and reversible.

Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's ruling that the
Leones' court costs are chargeable to the P.O.D. account.

C. Television and antenna.
The trial court again erred as a matter of fact and as a matter
of law in concluding that the cost of the television and antenna could
be paid out of the P.O.D. account.

It is an undisputable fact,

established by stipulation and court order, that Mrs. Southwick was
comatose.

(Record, page 19, 1 1; page 28, 11).

By the express terms

of the February 3, 1998 Stipulation and the March 2, 1988 Order, the
cost of the television and antenna could not properly be charged to
the P.O.D. account.

Furthermore, Judge Rokich specifically ruled at

trial of this matter that the cost of the television and antenna could
not be charged to the P.O.D. account.

(Record, page 385, lines 5-7,

19-21).
Because the purchase of the television and antenna was not a
necessary medical expense or for Mrs. Southwick1s necessary support
and maintenance, those purchases could not properly be charged to the
P.O.D. account.

Because the Leones had access to other funds with

which to purchase the television and antenna, they were not legally
entitled to invade the P.O.D. account for payment of those purchases.
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter
of law in concluding that the costs of the television and antenna
could be paid out of the P.O.D. account.
and reversible.

That error was prejudicial

Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's

ruling that the Leones' court costs are chargeable to the P.O.D.
account.
This portion of Judge Rokich's memorandum decision declaring that
the costs of the television and antenna could be charged to the P.O.D.
account is particularly confusing because at trial he specifically
ruled that the costs of the television and antenna could not be
charged to the P.O.D. account.

Yet, in his memorandum decision, he

included those items as charges against the P.O.D. account.
Unfortunately, Judge Rokich retired before an explanation of the

contradiction of his in court ruling and his memorandum decision could
be obtained.
D. Conservator's Fees.
The trial court further erred as a matter of fact and as a matter
of law in concluding that any "conservator's fees" could be paid out
of the P.O.D. account, even if the Leones were entitled to
conservator's fees, which they are not.

It is an undisputable fact,

established by the February 3, 1988 Stipulation and the March 2, 1988
Court Order, that any conservator's fees could not properly be charged
to the P.O.D. account.

It is undisputable that conservator's fees are

not for Mrs. Southwick's necessary medical expense or for Mrs.
Southwick's necessary support and maintenance.

Furthermore, Judge

Rokich specifically ruled at trial of this matter that only the costs
of Mrs. Southwick's burial plot and burial plan could be charged to
the P.O.D. account.

(Record, page 385, lines 5-7, 19-21).

Because the conservator's fees are not necessary medical expense
or for Mrs. Southwick's necessary support and maintenance, those
alleged expenses could not properly be charged to the P.O.D. account.
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of fact and as a matter
of law in concluding that the Leones' alleged conservator's fees could
be paid out of the P.O.D. account.
reversible.

That error was prejudicial and

Therefore, this Court must reverse the trial court's

ruling that the Leones' alleged conservator's fees are chargeable to
the P.O.D. account.5
The Leones assert that Mr. Southwick improperly requested conservators' fees while asserting that the Leones are not entitled to such
fees. Mr. Southwick's Petition for Appointment as Conservator does contain a request for conservators. However, unlike the Leones request it was
timely and appropriately filed with the trial court. It also was only for $2,500.00 not $30,000.00 plus as the Leones and unlike the Leones Mr.
Southwick never paid himself any conservators fees. He received no fees.

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AWARDING THE LEONES
CONSERVATOR'S FEES, BECAUSE THE LEONES REQUEST FOR CONSERVATOR'S FEES
WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Contrary to the Leones' assertion, their request for
conservator's fees is clearly barred by the statute of limitations set
forth in Utah Code §75-3-803 (hereinafter, "§75-5-803").

It is an

undisputed fact that no personal representative was ever appointed for
Mrs. Southwick's Estate.

It is also an undisputed fact that no

attorney was ever retained to represent any nonexistent personal
representative of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick.

It is a further

undisputed fact and an undisputed conclusion of law that the Leones
had no authority to hire Mr. Hadley as counsel for the Estate of Mrs.
Southwick.

(Record at page 699.)

And it is an undisputed fact that

the Leones' "Billing Requests'' were not filed with the trial court
until February 21, 1992.

(Record, pages 274, 279).6

Utah Code §75-5-804 (hereinafter, "§75-5-804") specifies how
claims against an estate must be presented.

In pertinent part, §75-5-

804 (1) (a) declares:
The claimant may deliver or mail to the personal representative, or the personal
representative's attorney of record, a written statement of the claim indicating its basis,
the name and address of the claimant, and the amount claimed, or may file a written
statement of the claim, in the form prescribed by this rule, with the clerk of the court

(Emphasis added).
In this case, the Leones never filed any request for conservator's
fees with the personal representative of the Estate of Mrs. Southwick,
because there was no personal representative with which to file a
6 Curiously, the Leones claim on appeal they presented their "Requests" to Mr. Hadley in April 1991 and that that presentment was
sufficient to comply with the provisions of Utah Code §75-3-804. Yet, the Leones captioned their "Requests" to the Third District Court. If the
Leones had truly intended to present their "Requests" to Mr. Hadley in April 1991 rather than to the court in 1992, it is extremely unlikely they would
have captioned their "Requests" to the Third District Court.

claim.

The Leones, likewise, never filed any request for

conservator's fees with the attorney of record for the personal
representative of Mrs. Southwick1s Estate, again, because there was no
attorney for the nonexistent personal representative of the Estate of
Mrs. Southwick.
Because there was no personal representative of the Estate of
Mrs. Southwick and no attorney of record for the personal
representative, the Leones could, as a matter of law, only make a
claim for conservator's fees by filing such claims with the clerk of
the court.

They did so, but not for over thirteen months after Mrs.

Southwick had died and not within the time periods mandated by §75-5803.
Because the Leones' claims were not filed with the clerk of the
court within the time mandated by §75-5-803, their claims are barred
by the express provisions of §75-5-803.

Because the Leones' claims

for conservator's fees are barred by the express provisions of §75-5803, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when
it awarded the Leones conservator's fees.

Therefore, this Court must

reverse the trial court's award of conservator's fees, instruct the
trial court to award Mr. Southwick his half of the conservator's fees
improperly deducted from the P.O.D. account, and to hold the Leones
personally liable to Mr. Southwick for the payment of Mr. Southwick's
share of the P.O.D. account. 7

The Leones assert in footnote 13 of their Brief that Mr. Southwick "again shows his willingness to distort the record." Without any
citation to the record or an iota of evidence, the Leones assert that Mrs. Southwick was only in the Benion Care Center for approximately seven
months. Yet they filed documents with the trial court alleging that they paid Benion Care Center for Mrs. Southwick's care from March 1990 through
January 1991, a period of 11 months. (Record, pages 585, 588).

POINT VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LEONES
HAD ANY AUTHORITY TO PAY ANY EXPENSES AFTER MRS. SOUTHWICK'S DEATH.
In Point VI of their Brief the Leones admit that they had no
authority to act on behalf of Mrs. Southwick or her estate, after her
death,(Leones' Brief, page 45); yet, they assert that they had the
legal right to pay bills allegedly incurred prior to Mrs. Southwick's
death, even though those alleged expenses were not for Mrs.
Southwick's medical needs or for her support and maintenance.

The

validity of the disputed expenses has been fully addressed previously
in this Brief and will not be addressed again.
If Mrs. Southwick and/or her estate had expenses to pay after her
death, that responsibility rested with the personal representative of
her estate, not with the Leones.

The Leones' obligation was to turn-

over Mrs. Southwick's bills and funds to the personal representative
of her estate, not to act as if they had been appointed personal
representative.

The Leones were represented by counsel.

They should

have known their legal authority and the limitations on that
authority.

Judge Rokich's statement that the Leones had authority to

pay any obligations of Mrs. Southwick is simply incorrect.
As previously set forth in this Brief, the trial court's judgment
allowing expenses of Mrs. Southwick's burial, the cost of her burial
plot, the costs of the television and antenna, the alleged court cost
of the Leones, and conservator's fees to the Leones is improper and
legally defective and must be reversed.

VII
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Because the trial court erred in concluding that the expenses for
Mrs. Southwickfs burial plot, her burial expenses, the Leones Coconservator's fees, the purchase of a television & antenna, and court
costs, were legitimate expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs medical expenses
and/or necessary expenses for her support and maintenance and thus
chargeable against the P.O.D. account the trial courts Judgment must
be reversed.

Because the trial court erred in computing Mr.

Southwickfs share of the P.O.D. account, because the trial court erred
as a matter of law in concluding that the Leones were entitled to
conservator's fees, and because the trial court erred as a matter of
law in concluding that the Leones were not personally liable to Mr.
Southwick for his share of the P.O.D. account they unlawfully gave to
Ms. Montoya, this Court must reverse the trial courts1 judgment and
direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Southwick
against the Leones, personally.

This Court must also instruct the

trial court enter a ruling that the Leones are not entitled to any
conservator fees, and that the expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs burial
plot, her burial expenses, the Leones Co-conservator fees, the purchase of a television & antenna, and court costs allegedly incurred by
the Leones, in their bad faith defense of Mr. Southwick1s claim to his
rightful share of the P.O.D. account are not chargeable to the P.O.D.
account.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Southwick respectfully prays that this Court
issue an order reversing the judgment of the trial court and declaring

lat the Leones are not entitled to any conservator's fees in this
itter, that the expenses for Mrs. Southwickfs burial plot, her burial
cpenses, the Leones conservator's fees, the purchase of a television
antenna, and court costs allegedly incurred by the Leones, in their
d faith defense of Mr. Southwickfs claim to his rightful share of
e P.O.D. account, are not chargeable against the P.O.D. account and
at the Leones are personally liable to Mr. Southwick for his share
the P.O.D. account they unlawfully gave to Ms. Montoya.
Respectfully submitted th i s ^
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Statutes:
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Statutes:
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was rendered harmless. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1981).
Refusal to grant mistrial.
The burden is on the appellant to show affirmatively that the refusal to grant a mistrial
was error prejudicial to his case. Burton v.
Zions Co-op. Mercantile Inst., 122 Utah 360,
249 P.2d 514 (1952).
Service of summons.
This rule cannot be used as a catch-all to
cover up defects, errors, or omissions upon
which the rights and duties of adverse parties
depend, and where deputy failed to date summons left with defendant, the summons was
defective under Rule 4(j), and the defect could
not be regarded as a mere irregularity. Rees v.
Scott, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877 (1958).
Failure of the person serving a summons to
endorse upon the copy of the summons served
the date of service substantially affects the
rights of the person served and is grounds for
quashing the summons without further proof
of harm. Rees v. Scott, 8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d
877 (1958).
Substantiality of error.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to disregard errors unless they are so substantial as to
affect the rights of the parties or the likely outcome of the case. Hi 11 yard v. Utah By-Products
Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Harris v. Utah Transit
Auth., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983)
Only when there is error both substantial
and prejudicial, and when there is a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been different without it, should error be regarded as
sufficient to upset a judgment or to grant a new
trial. Bowden v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 3 Utah
2d 444, 286 P.2d 240 (1955); Batt v. State, 28
Utah 2d 417, 503 P.2d 855 <1972).
On appeal, the burden is upon the appellant
not only to show that then; was error, but that
the error was prejudicial to the extent that
there is reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.
Joseph v. W.H. Grows Latter-Day Saints
Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (-I960);
Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d
406 (1963); Ewell & Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City
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Corp., 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 (1972);
Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui Inv. Inc., 522
P.2d 1370 (Utah 1974).
An appellate court will not reverse a judgment for mere error, unless the error involved
is substantial and prejudicial. Kesler v.
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975).
An error is harmful only if the likelihood of a
different outcome is high enough to undermine
confidence in the verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins.
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Trial error corrected in judgment.
A buyer under a conditional sales contract
was not prejudiced by a conclusion of law in
which inadvertently no credit had been given
to him for an amount that was due to him, and
according to which the seller was thus entitled
to a judgment in a certain larger sum, where
the court, in arriving at its judgment, correctly
credited to the buyer the amount that was due
to him, and entered judgment only for the difference. Knudsen Music Co. v. Masterson, 121
Utah 252, 240 P.2d 973 (1952).
Cited in State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345,
359 P.2d 12 (1961); Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah
2d 364, 412 P.2d 451 (1966); Estate of
McFarland v. Holt, 18 Utah 2d 127, 417 P.2d
244 (1966); Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Johnson,
552 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1976); Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah
1977); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828
(Utah 1980); State ex rel. K.K.H., 610 P.2d 849
(Utah 1980); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d
710 (Utah 19H2); Made.sen v. Brown, 701 P.2d
1086 (Utah 1985); Chandler v. Mathews, 734
P.2d 907 (Utah 1987); Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155 (Utah 19*8/,
Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Belden v. O^.. H e . 752 P.2d
1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); King v. _
ui, 770
P.2d 975 (Utah 1988); Mann v. Wadswoiui,
776 P.2d 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Ostler v.
Albina Transf. Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989); Marshall v. Van Gerven, 790 P.2d
62 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Huston v. Lewis, 818
P.2d 531 (Utah 1991); Evans ex rel. Evans v.
Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
Steffensen v. Smith's Mgt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); In re Estate of Hunt, 842
P.2d 872 (Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. J u r . 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 702, 776 to 819; 58 Am. J u r . 2d New
Trial § 31.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 825 et
seq.; 6^ C.J.S. New Trial § 13.
A.L.R. — Counsel's argument or comment

stating or implying that defendant is not insured and will have to pay verdict himself as
prejudicial error, 68 A.L.R.4th 954.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=> 1025
to 1074, 1170; New Trial «=» 27.

Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately upon the entry of the judgment,
unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment In its discretion and
on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending
the disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment
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made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a judgment or order
made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a motion for judgment in accordance with a
motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for
amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule
52(b).
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction
during the pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper
for the security of the rights of the adverse party.
(d) Stay u p o n a p p e a l . When an appeal is taken the appellant by giving a
supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of filing
the notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court.
(e) Stay in favor of t h e s t a t e , o r a g e n c y thereof. When an appeal is
taken by the United States, the state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either,
or by direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement
of the judgment is stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be
required from the appellant.
(f) Stay in quo w a r r a n t o p r o c e e d i n g s . Where the defendant is adjudged
guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or
military, within this state, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed
on an appeal.
(g) P o w e r of a p p e l l a t e c o u r t n o t limited. The provisions in this rule do
not limit any power of an appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to stay
proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or to suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction, writ of mandate or writ of prohibition during the
pendency of an appeal or to make any order appropriate to preserve the status
quo or the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be entered.
(h) Stay of judgment u p o n multiple c l a i m s . When a court has ordered a
final judgment on some but not all of the claims presented in the action under
the conditions stated in Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of that
judgment until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may
prescribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit thereof to tne
party in whose favor the judgment is entered.
(i) E x c e p t i n g to s u r e t i e s ; justification; m u l t i p l e s u r e t i e s ; d e p o s i t in
Heu of b o n d . The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the sureties
to the undertaking filed pursuant to the provisions of this rule at any time
within 10 days after written notice of the filing of such undertakings; and,
unless they or other sureties, within 10 days after service of the notice of such
exception, justify before a judge of the court in which the judgment was entered, or the clerk thereof, upon not less than five days' notice to the party
excepting to such sureties of the time and place of justification, execution of
the judgment is no longer stayed. In all cases where the bond required exceeds
$2,000 and there are more than two sureties thereon, they may state in their
affidavit, ^ t they are severally worth the amounts for which they agree to
be found if leb* v. ,. +hat expressed in the undertaking, provided the whole
amount ^ equivalent to tnat of two sufficient sureties. In all cases where an
unde r tpkmg is required by these rules a deposit in court in the amount of such
undertaking, or such lesser amount as the court may order, is equivalent to
the filing of the undertaking
(j) Waiver of u n d e r t a k i n g . In all cases the parties may by written stipulation waive the requirements of this rule with resppct to the filing of a bond or
undertaking.
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personal representative's compensation or the attorney's compensation and if no objection is filed by an interested person to
the compensation requested, reasonable compensation shall
be the compensation sought in the petition. When an interested person objects to the personal representative's compensation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for
the personal representative based on the quality, quantity,
and 'alue of the services rendered to the estate and the
circumstances under which those services were rendered,
including the practice for other fiduciaries who are in similar
circumstances to the personal representative in question.
When an interested person objects to the attorney's compensation, the court shall determine reasonable compensation for
the attorney based on rules adopted by the Judicial Council.
(2) When a petition seeks approval of or objects to a
personal representative's compensation or an attorney's compensation, at least ten days before the time set for the hearing
of the petition, the petitioner or the petitioner's attorney shall
send a copy of the petition to all interested persons either by
certified, registered, or first class mail or by hand-delivery.
(3) If a will provides for compensation of the personal
representative and there is no contract with the decedent
regarding compensation, the personal representative may
renounce the provision before qualifying and be entitled to
reasonable compensation. A personal representative also may
renounce his right to all or any part of the compensation. A
written renunciation of fee may be filed with the court. 1982
75-3-719. Expenses in estate litigation.
If any personal representative or person nominated as
personal representative defends or prosecutes any proceeding
in good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to
receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees incurred.
1975
75-3-720. Proceedings for review of employment of
agents and compensation of personal representatives and employees of estate.
After notice to all interested persons, on petition of an
interested person or on appropriate motion if administration
is supervised, the propriety of employment of any person by a
personal representative, including any attorney, auditor, investment advisor, or other specialized agent or assistant, the
reasonableness of the compensation of any person so employed, or the reasonableness of the compensation determined
by the personal representative for the personal representative's own services, may be reviewed by the court. Any person
who has received excessive compensation from an estate for
services rendered may be ordered to make appropriate refunds.
1992
PART 8
CREDITORS' CLAIMS
75-3-801. Notice to creditors.
(1) Unless notice has already been given under this section,
a personal representative upon his appointment shall publish
a notice to creditors once a week for three successive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the county announcing
the personal representative's appointment and address and
notifying creditors of the estate to present their claims within
three months after the date of the first publication of the
notice or be forever barred.
(2) A personal representative may give written notice by
mail or other delivery to any creditor, notifying the creditor to
present his claim within 90 days from the published notice if
given as provided in Subsection (1) above or within 60 days
from the mailing or other delivery of the notice, whichever is
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later, or be forever barred. Written notice shall be the mm
described in Subsection (1) above or a similar notice.
(3) The personal representative shall not be liable to ri|
creditor or to any successor of the decedent for giving or faiial
to give notice under this section.
u|
75-3-802. Statutes of limitations.
Unless an estate is insolvent the personal representauaj
with the consent of all successors whose interests would m
affected, may waive any defense of limitations available to tid
estate. If the defense* is not waived, no claim which was barn]
by any statute of limitations at the time of the decedesal
death shall be allowed or paid. The running of any statute ei
limitations measured from some other event than death aa]
advertisement for claims against a decedent is suspend*!
during the three months following the decedent's death bq
resumes thereafter as to claims not barred pursuant to tw
sections which follow. For purposes of any statute of lixnUH
tions, the proper presentation of a claim under Section 7541
804 is equivalent to commencement of a proceeding on m
claim.
iff)
75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims.
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose befo^
the death of the decedent, including claims of the state aii
any subdivision of it, whether due or to become due, absolute*
or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract,
tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statu**
of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent*
unless presented within the earlier of the following dates:
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(23
for creditors who are given actual notice, and where notice
is published, within the time provided in Subsectic*
75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publication.
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute it
the decedent's domicile are also barred in this state.
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or
after the death of the decedent, including claims of the staa
and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become due.
absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on
contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against thi
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and deviseei
of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal
representative within three months after performance bj
the personal representative is due; or
(b) any other claim within the later of three monthi
after it arises, or the time specified in Subsection (l)(a).
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, oi
other lien upon property of the estate;
(b) to the limits of the insurant protection only, anj
proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or thi
personal representative for which he is protected bj
liability insurance; or
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and
reimbursement for expenses advanced by the personal
representative or by the attorney or accountant for the
personal representative of the estate.
lm
75-3-804. Manner of presentation of claims.
(1) Claims against a decedent's estate may be presented ai
follows:
(a) The claimant may deliver or mail to the persona
representative, or the personal representative's attorne)
of record, a written statement of the claim indicating IU
basis, the name and address of the claimant, and th«
amount claimed, or may file a written statement of th«
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claim, in the form prescribed by rule, with the clerk of the
court. The claim is deemed presented on either the receipt
of the written statement of claim by the personal representative or the personal representative's attorney of
record, or the filing of the claim with the court, whichever
occurs first. If a claim is not yet due, the date when it will
become due shall be stated. If the claim is contingent or
unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty shall be
stated. If the claim is secured, the security shall be
described. Failure to describe correctly the security, the
nature of any uncertainty, and the due date of a claim not
yet due does not invalidate the presentation made.
(b) The claimant may commence a proceeding against
the personal representative in any court where the personal representative may be subjected to jurisdiction to
obtain payment of the claim against the estate, but the
commencement of the proceeding must occur within the
time limited for presenting the claim. No presentation of
claim is required in regard to matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which were pending at the time
of the decedent's death.
(2) If a claim is presented under Subsection (l)(a), no
proceeding thereon may be commenced more than 60 days
after the personal representative has mailed a notice of
disallowance; but, in the case of a claim which is not presently
due or which is contingent or unliquidated, the personal
representative may consent to an extension of the 60-day
period, or to avoid injustice the court, on petition, may order
an extension of the 60-day period, but in no event may the
extension run beyond the applicable statute of limitations.
1088

75-3-805. Classification of claims.
(1) If the applicable assets of the estate are insufficient to
pay ail claims in full, the personal representative shall make
payment in the following order:
(a) Reasonable funeral expenses;
(b) Costs and expenses of administration;
(c) Debts and taxes with preference under federal law;
(d) Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital
expenses >f the last illness of the decedent, including
compens juon of persons attending him;
(e) Debts and taxes with preference under other laws of
this state;
(f) All other claims.
(2) No preference shall be given in the payment of any claim
over any other claim of the same class, and a claim due and
payable shall not be entitled to a preference over claims not
due.
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15-3-806. Allowance of claims.
[1) As to claims presented in the manner described in
Section 75-3-804 and within the time limit prescribed in
Section 75-3-803, the personal representative may mail a
notice to any claimant stating that the claim has been allowed
or disallowed. If, after allowing or disallowing a claim, the
personal representative changes the decision concerning the
claim, the personal representative shall notify the claimant.
The personal representative may not change a disallowance of
a claim after the time for the claimant to file a petition for
allowance or to commence a proceeding on the claim has
expired and the claim has been barred. If the notice of
disallowance warns the claimant of the impending bar, a claim
which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal
representative is barred so far as not allowed, unless the
claimant seeks a court ordered allowance by filing a petition
for allowance in the court or by commencing a proceeding
against the personal representative not later than 60 days
after the mailing of the notice of disallowance or partial
allowance. If the personal representative fails to mail notice to
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a claimant of action on the claim within 60 days after the time
for original presentation of the claim has expired, this failure
has the effect of a notice of allowance.
(2) Upon the petition of the personal representative or a
claimant in a proceeding for this purpose, the court may order
any claim presented to the personal representative or filed
with the clerk of the court in a timely manner and not barred
by Subsection (1) to be allowed in whole or in part. Notice of
this proceeding shall be given to the claimant, the personal
representative, and those other persons interested in the
estate as the court may direct by order at the time the
proceeding is commenced.
(3) A judgment in a proceeding in another court against a
personal representative to enforce a claim against a decedent's
estate is a court ordered allowance of the claim.
(4) Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another
court entered against the personal representative, allowed
claims bear interest at the legal rate for the period commencing six months after the decedent's date of death unless based
on a contract making a provision for interest, in which case
they bear interest in accordance with that provision.
1992
75-3-807. Payment of claims.
(1) Upon the expiration of the earliest of the time limitations provided in Section 75-3-803 for the presentation of
claims, the personal representative shall proceed to pay the
claims allowed against the estate in the order of priority
prescribed, after making provision for homestead, family, and
support allowances, for claims already presented which have
not yet been allowed or whose allowance has been appealed,
and for unbarred claims which may yet be presented, including costs and expenses of administration. By petition to the
court in a proceeding for the purpose, or by appropriate motion
if the administration is supervised, a claimant whose claim
has been allowed but not paid as provided in this section may
secure an order directing the personal representative to pay
the claim to the extent that funds of the estate are available
for the payment.
(2) The personal representative at any time may pay any
just claim that has not been barred, with or without formal
presentation, but he is personally liable to any other claimant
whose claim is allowed and who is injured by such payment if:
(a) the payment was made before the expiration of the
time limit stated in Subsection (1) and the personal
representative failed to require the payee to give adequate security for the refund of any of the payment
necessary to pay other claimants; or
(b) the payment was made, due to the negligence or
willful fault of the personal representative, in such mane
ner as to deprive the injured claimant of his priority.
1B92

75-3-808. Individual liability of personal representative.
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal
representative is not individually liable on a contract properly
entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.
(2) A personal representative is individually liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of the estate or for
torts committed in the course of administration of the estate
only if he is personally at fault.
(3) Claims based on contracts entered into by a personal
representative in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising
from ownership or control of the estate, or on torts committed
in the course of estate administration may be asserted against
the estate by proceeding against the personal representative
in his fiduciary capacity, whether or not the personal representative is individually liable therefor.

